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On Wittgenstein’s Analogy between 
Philosophy and Psychoanalysis
ABSTRACT: Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychoanalysis can be viewed as a critical ap-
proach to Freudian speculation, but this is not our concern in the present essay. 
Here we want to examine the analogy, which Wittgenstein acknowledges, between 
his own understanding of philosophy and the style of thinking that characterizes 
psychoanalytic therapy. Both psychoanalysis and philosophy appear as precious 
pursuits and, in different respects, as dangerous enterprises. In Wittgenstein’s eyes 
they are to be appreciated as ‘therapeutic activities’. However, when they try to 
become theories with scientifi c ambitions, they turn out to be dubious or even 
harmful spiritual offshoots. In the present essay we explore three features that are 
essential to such analogy. 1) Both philosophy and psychoanalysis appear as thera-
pies that make use of language: they are ‘treatments’ that take place at the level 
of reasons, and not causes. 2) Both treatments are attempts to tackle motivational 
confl icts, which are at the roots of specifi c forms of ‘mental unease’. 3) The rel-
evant motivational confl icts are characterized by being inscrutable as to their real 
grounds, and their harmfulness is proportional to their inscrutable (‘unconscious’) 
character. Our purpose is to discuss this qualifi ed analogy between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis in order to improve our understanding of the role of metaphysics 
in human refl ection.
KEYWORDS: Wittgenstein, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, motivational confl ict, uncon-
scious.
1. Psychoanalysis and philosophy
Wittgenstein’s relation to psychoanalysis has often given the impression of be-
ing ambivalent, even contradictory. On the one hand, as reported by Rush Rhees, 
Wittgenstein occasionally expressed himself in very appreciative terms towards 
psychoanalysis, considering himself a sort of “disciple” and “follower” of Freud1. 
Yet, he also spoke in rather dismissive terms of Freud’s theory, regarded as mere 
1 L. Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief 
(Vorlesungen und Gespräche über Ästhetik, Psychoanalyse und religiösen Glauben), compiled 
from notes taken by Y. Smythies, R. Rhees, and J. Taylor, ed. by C. Barrett, Oxford, Basil Black-
well, 1966, p. 41.
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“speculation”2 and as a kind of harmful “mythology”3. Most of the secondary 
literature devoted to Wittgenstein’s relation to psychoanalysis is concerned with 
Wittgenstein’s epistemological criticism of the Freudian enterprise. Wittgenstein’s 
sparse remarks on psychoanalysis target Freud’s missing differentiation between 
reasons and causes4, and his propensity to produce mythological accounts of phe-
nomena while claiming their scientifi c status5. Most authors are sympathetic with 
Wittgenstein’s criticisms6, even if there is also room for the idea that Wittgenstein 
is misrepresenting the Freudian project7.
Our concern in the present paper, however, is not with Wittgenstein’s critical 
evaluation of Freudian psychoanalysis, but with the analogy that the Austrian phi-
losopher perceives and acknowledges between his own understanding of philoso-
phy and the style of thinking that psychoanalytic therapy inaugurates8. Therefore, 
we are not going to examine whether, or to which extent, Wittgenstein’s rare re-
marks are signifi cant for our understanding of psychoanalysis, but we are inter-
ested in seeing whether the analogy with psychoanalysis may help to clarify Witt-
genstein’s interpretation of the role of philosophy.
As we noticed, Wittgenstein seems to have a split attitude towards psychoanaly-
sis, and this attitude seems to mirror the philosopher’s own attitude towards phi-
losophy as such. Wittgenstein seems to consider both psychoanalysis and philoso-
phy precious pursuits, to the extent that they play a practical role as ‘therapies’; 
whereas it seems that they should be considered dubious or even harmful propos-
als insofar as they try to provide a theory with scientifi c ambitions.
Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy can be epitomized by the following 
well-known remarks:
the real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tor-
mented by questions which bring itself in question. – Instead, we now demonstrate 
a method, by examples, – and the series of examples can be broken off. – Problems 
are solved (diffi culties eliminated), not a single problem. There is not a philosophical 
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies9.
2 Ivi, p. 44.
3 Ivi, pp. 51-52.
4 F. Cioffi , Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 
p. 206.
5 J. Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud. The Myth of the Unconscious, Princeton, Princ-
eton University Press, 1995, pp. 122-123.
6 Cf. J. Bouveresse, op. cit. pp. 27 f.; J. M. Heaton, The Talking Cure. Wittgenstein’s Therapeu-
tic Method for Psychotherapy, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, pp. 64 f.
7 M. Lazerowitz, The Language of Philosophy. Freud and Wittgenstein, Dordrecht, Reidel 
Publishing, 1977, pp. 18 f. 
8 Cf. J. Bouveresse, op. cit., pp. 11 f.; J. M. Heaton, op. cit., pp. VIII-IX.
9 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen), ed. by G. 
E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, Engl. transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1958, p. 133.
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Thus, “[t]he philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an 
illness”10.
It seems therefore that different understandings of philosophy may lead to see 
it either as disease or as therapy, actually even as therapy of a disease produced by 
philosophy itself (or at least by a specifi c philosophical attitude). We fi nd the roots 
of this approach already in Wittgenstein’s early philosophical commitment, well 
represented by the design of the Tractatus. The affi nities between the Tractatus and 
the project of Kant’s fi rst Critique are patent. The sentences concerning the Kan-
tian ideas of pure reason (World, God and the Self), which in Kant’s analysis turn 
out to be ultimately refractory to intellectual ascertainment, and thus ‘metaphysi-
cal’, are denounced by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as unsinnig (nonsensical). In the 
Tractatus unsinnig is what gives the impression of being a well-determined image 
of something, while being intrinsically incapable of veridical representation. This 
nonsensical character of propositions is not to be confused with the possibility that 
a proposition be merely without sense (sinnlos): tautologies and contradictions 
do not provide any determinate representation, but do not promise to provide it 
either, and therefore are labelled sinnlos, not unsinnig. The sphere of the proposi-
tions that are unsinnig is the sphere of metaphysical illusion, which, in the Trac-
tatus, should be neutralized by establishing strict rules for a legitimate linguistic 
representation. As is well known, in the eyes of its author this attempt turned out 
to be unviable. In the Tractatus the criterion of meaningfulness that should have 
outlawed metaphysical propositions was identifi ed with the possibility of sentenc-
es to project onto states of affairs; yet, this criterion appeared to be inadequate. 
In the successive work, the criterion of sense (meaningfulness) of representations 
shifted towards the intersubjective use of language and its functions: the meaning 
of linguistic expressions rests on their ordinary use and we have to look at such 
use in order to clarify conceptual enigmas. Still, the aim of Wittgenstein’s analysis 
remained essentially the same: by establishing the proper meaningful use of lan-
guage we should be in a position to redress all senseless expressions that lead to the 
confusions that he labels “mental cramps”11 or “knots in our thought”12.
These expressions are renowned, but not necessarily perspicuous. Why, after all, 
should such ‘mental cramps’ be so important to induce somebody like Wittgenstein 
to devote a life of investigation to them? In fact, here the analogy with psychoanalysis 
may succor us. Psychoanalytic therapy is primarily justifi ed by the subsistence of a 
sphere of behaviors and attitudes, which we consider pathological; and the pathol-
ogy is primarily signaled by some kind of sufferance. Should we try to identify a kind 
of sufferance staged by philosophical mistakes and metaphysical delusions? This is 
a promising perspective.
10 Ivi, p. 255.
11 L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, ed. by R. Rhees, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1958, p. 1.
12 Idem, Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Engl. transl. by G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1970, § 452.
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In the tradition of Freudian psychoanalysis, three features are salient for the 
analogy we are exploring.
1) The treatment makes use of language, and therefore is an intervention that 
takes place at the level of reasons and not causes (e.g., medicaments).
2) The treatment tries to tackle a motivational confl ict, which is at the roots of 
the genesis of psychoneuroses13.
3) The relevant confl ict is not just an ordinary confl ict between motives or im-
pulses, but is inscrutable as to its real grounds: the confl ict is “unconscious” and 
the solution to the confl ict should mainly consist in bringing to the light of con-
sciousness what previously was just obscurely compelling (“Wo Es war, soll Ich 
werden”14).
In the next paragraphs we shall try to show what can be understood as ‘mo-
tivational confl ict’ (§ 2), how such a confl ict is made possible by the rules of the 
constitution of meanings in language (§§ 3, 4), and what such confl ict may have to 
do with metaphysical statements (§ 5).
Let us try to clarify the sense of these instances for the Wittgensteinian project.
2. The structure of motivational confl ict
Ordinary confl icts between competing motives do not lead to neurosis or to 
special conditions of mental sufferance. Each conscious, instinctive or habitual 
act of ours often meets contrasting instances and what usually happens is just that 
an immanent preference takes place and produces an ordering of options. We may 
be hungry and food may be in front of us, and yet straightforwardly going for it 
may be perceived as dangerous, or improper, or illegal, etc. We mostly solve these 
confl icts just by feeling a propensity towards the preferred behavioral route, or oc-
casionally, as refl ective beings, we may weigh different alternatives in imagination 
and then take a rational deliberation about the most convenient action. Neither 
case of motivational confl ict is especially problematic.
What if we suppose that the options in front of us have a perfectly equivalent 
‘motivational power’? Would this amount to an insoluble clash of motivations? 
This would be a ‘Buridan’s ass’ situation, which in fact does not represent any 
problem for human deliberation either: situations in which our choice may be 
underdetermined, that is, where there is no overriding reason to decide one way 
rather than another, are very common. They can be perfectly tackled by a behav-
ioral equivalent of the rule: “If there are two incompatible reasons to act, and 
neither is overriding, just act in either way (randomly)”. Stalemate is no option in 
13 Cf. H. Smith, Conceptions of Confl ict in Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice, in “Psychoana-
lytic Quarterly”, LXXII (2003), pp. 49-96, pp. 52-53.
14 S. Freud, Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, Wien, Inter-
nationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1933; Engl. transl. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by 
G. Strachey, vol. XXII, London, Hogarth Press, 1964, p. 80.
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all cases of confl ict between equivalent motivations and the necessity to give up an 
equally valued option does not represent any instance of frustration.
In fact, all ordinary limitations and inadequate satisfactions that living beings 
encounter in the life of consciousness do not involve any frustrating (and neuroso-
genetic) stalemate. If a gazelle (or a man) is thirsty but fears the lion approaching 
to the pond, this is no terrain for the genesis of neurosis; there is indeed a struggle 
between competing impulses and then a decisional outcome, which may even turn 
out to be fatal for the gazelle (or the man), but is nevertheless not psychologically 
disturbing. Psychological sufferance and possibly neurosis need something else, 
in order to emerge. An old observation by Pavlov can suggest what it is: in a well-
known experiment Pavlov conditioned dogs so that the vision of a circle signalized 
the availability of food, while the vision of an ellipse signalized its absence. Once 
the conditioning was settled, Pavlov began to make less and less distinguishable 
the difference between the shapes of circles and ellipses, down to a point where 
they were indistinguishable. At this point the failure to draw the appropriate infer-
ences by the dog began to induce what Pavlov called an “experimental neurosis”, 
involving a plurality of dysfunctional behaviors by the dog, from high irritability, 
barking, aggression, to a depressed and passive attitude15. Of course, to call this 
behavior ‘neurosis’ in exactly the same sense in which we speak of human neurosis 
may be hasty and dubious, but the analogy is striking and is enough to suggest the 
presence of a similar core. What we can reasonably conjecture is that the neuroso-
genesis is not due just to a contrast of motivations or to their insuffi cient clarity, 
but by the presence of a contrast between norms, which in this case are behavioral 
implications governed by signs. The relevant confl ict here can be read as follows: I 
learned to act this way and now I am submitted to an incompatible demand, which 
leaves me disoriented. Here the confl ict is not between impulses or desires, but 
between norms. If Pavlov’s experiment would be more than an occasional prop for 
our argument, we would try to show that the usual reading of the experiment is 
wrong: the frustration is not generated by the sheer need to subvert a consolidated 
habit. The dog was in relation to the experimenter and was reading the connection 
between perceived signs and food in normative terms. Yet, regardless of conjec-
tures about the dog’s attitude, we can directly consider what our own attitude 
would be.
Changes of consolidated habits may be distressing, but they belong to the physi-
ology of life: in ordinary life habits are updated, or even dropped, all the time, 
without any frustrating confl ict. But if we have to do with a clash of norms (de-
mands), then, and only then, the motivational contrast is properly insoluble. Only 
the confl ict between two normative elements, two orders, demands, claims, im-
peratives, etc. cannot be straightforwardly solved by cutting the Gordian knot and 
‘jumping into action’. Two desires of mine can be freely ordered by me according 
to my preferences or lack of preferences. Even if such desires depend on settled 
15 B. Hergenhahn, Introduction to the History of Psychology, Belmont, Wadsworth Publish-
ing Company, 2008, p. 392.
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habits, the relevant acts are still in my power. But two confl icting normative theses 
cannot be so treated, because compliance with one of them implies the rejection of 
the other, and, insofar as the source of motivation in a normative confl ict is outside 
me, I cannot dispose of it at my will. Still, if I am conscious of the source of such 
norms, I may take position and fi nd reasons to subordinate one normative source 
to the other. But this option is excluded if I have no conscious clarity about the 
relevant normative sources, and, as we will see, this is precisely why unconscious 
confl icts raise special problems.
3. Meaningfulness and rules
In order to understand how different reasons to act can clash with each other 
and why such a clash may lead to profound unease, down to psychological distur-
bances, we have to clarify how rules (and meanings) are constituted. In order to 
clarify this point a brief digression on Wittgenstein’s analysis of ‘following a rule’ 
is useful.
Wittgenstein’s refl ections on rules is too rich of implications to be exhaustively 
discussed in the present limits, but we will just provide a brief account of it, fo-
cusing on its implications for the constitution of linguistic meaning. Indeed, any 
discussion about the apprehension and essence of rules has repercussions on our 
understanding of how linguistic meaning works: not all rules are linguistic, but all 
meaningful use of language is governed by rules (i.e., is normative).
Wittgenstein’s analysis is primarily focused on the conditions that enable us to 
establish that a rule has been learned and that it is correctly followed. The fi rst 
problem to be met is the following: each rule as such has a potentially infi nite 
range of applications. Rules provide a ground to indefi nitely produce qualifi ed 
realizations, endowed with a common identity. Yet, what we learn and what we can 
refer to, whenever we want to justify a certain application of a rule, are just fi nite 
examples and specifi c boundaries, which are always open to reinterpretation. The 
problem is that nothing that we can learn, or entertain in thought, can warrant that 
the identity of the rule is going to be preserved, because no example and/or forbid-
dance can exhaustively determine all possible applications of a rule.
One of Wittgenstein’s best illustrations of the paradox of rules can be resumed 
as follows: if we try to teach a child to count by one (positive natural numbers), 
what we do is 1) to give examples, 2) to ask the pupil to produce samples of count-
ing on her own and 3) to correct her mistakes. Each of these interventions is cir-
cumscribed and provides only a specifi c fi nite experience. After a while, when it 
seems that the pupil is able to correctly go on by herself, we decide that she has 
learned the rule and that no more teaching is needed. Yet, it may well happen that 
at a certain point the pupil begins to produce instantiations of the rule that, while 
never explicitly forbidden, appear nevertheless as incorrect implementations of it. 
For instance, the pupil can count correctly by one up to one thousand and then she 
may continue by saying 1002, 1004, etc. If we object that this was not the way, in 
which we taught the rule, she may reply that those specifi c instantiations had not 
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been explicitly excluded either and that she thought that after one-thousand this 
was the correct way to proceed. But then, even if we rectify the application of the 
rule in this circumstance, nothing forbids that other unexpected interpretations 
pop up in further moments of the application of the rule. For instance, when she 
reaches 2000, she may begin to draw back by counting 1999, 1998, etc. and say 
that she understood that the sequence of numbers ‘rebounds’ from that ‘ceiling’ 
and rolls back toward zero, etc. Whatever the ‘misinterpretations’ that we can 
imagine, the conceptual core of the problem is that the rule involves an infi nite 
range of applications, while examples and corrections can only be fi nite and there-
fore they can never prevent all needs or options to ‘re-think’ the rule. The same 
kind of reasoning can be applied to each linguistic meaning that we have learned 
to use: we learned words in specifi c contexts and by specifi c persons, who put a 
limited amount of constraints to improper extensions of the relevant meaning.
Wittgenstein’s answer to such problem makes room for some crucial considerations. 
First, we should not believe that whenever we learn a rule, and whenever we apply 
it, we actually produce an interpretation of the examples or corrections that we have 
received16. Interpretations are peculiar processes where we actively formulate hypoth-
eses, and hypotheses presuppose that we entertain alternative options. If this were our 
ordinary procedure, we could never grasp any determinate rule because “everything 
can be made out to accord with the rule”17, that is, we can always fi nd a plurality of 
interpretations that could account for the same examples. The fact that some of these 
interpretations might strike us as unlikely, strained, awkward, etc. would imply noth-
ing as to their illegitimacy. But, as Wittgenstein notices, following a rule does not pri-
marily have the character of a choice among alternatives18, but is rather each time the 
straightforward enactment of a specifi c behavioral sequence, which, if not explicitly 
constrained or forbidden, simply goes on in an inertial way (“blindly”). This does not 
warrant that the rule will not be updated over time, but implies that, in the absence of 
reasons to change, the rule can preserve stability. Rules must be rooted in pre-linguistic 
habits, since we are never in a position to exhaustively explain the grounds that justify 
the adoption of a specifi c regulated behavior. Whenever a child learns a rule (and 
therefore also the meaning of words), teaching must rely on a background of attitudes, 
propensities and abilities, which can be tapped by signifi cation and exploited to ob-
tain a new consciously regulated ability. This background is necessarily pre-existent to 
any conscious deliberation. Any “justifi cation by experience comes to an end”19, and 
in any explanation “reasons will soon give out”20. Rules do not rule over their whole 
content precisely as words do not have command over theirs. Explanations of rules do 
not “transfer” the experiential or the attitudinal background from the teacher’s mind 
to the other’s one. We must confi de in a common nature in order to trust that common 
implications will be drawn in similar circumstances.
16 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, cit., § 201.
17 Ibidem.
18 Ivi, § 219.
19 Ivi, § 485.
20 Ivi, § 211.
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This observation implies that the background of abilities, propensities and at-
titudes that we rely on while learning rules is not openly displayed to our mind as 
a map. From our birth onwards we do not just learn about the external world, we 
learn as well what our abilities and attitudes are like, since they become manifest 
only to the extent they are properly applied. This means that we do not have di-
rect privileged access in the fi rst person to the roots of our conscious reasons. In 
other terms, the sphere of what is unconscious (in a non-technical acceptation of 
the term), far from being a special compartment of mind, extends to the whole 
of mental operations, by permeating, and being intertwined with, all of them. No 
conscious act of ours, no logical inference, no rational deliberation is self-transpar-
ent and perfectly in command of all its grounds and implications.
To this picture, as Wittgenstein remarks, we have to add that rules are not 
“something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once 
in his life”21. The ability to institute habits is a precondition for rules to be appre-
hended, but private habits are not already rules, because they lack intersubjective 
validity. If a private habit would already be a rule, then “thinking one was obeying 
a rule would be the same thing as obeying it”22. This would be the equivalent of 
the so-called ‘Humpty Dumpty theory’ for linguistic meanings, according to which 
words would mean just what the speakers want them to mean23. In order to consti-
tute meanings, words do require to be meant by speakers, but this is not enough: 
they must also be intersubjectively recognized and settled within shared limits of 
validity. Rules are preserved from arbitrary distortion by a community of recogniz-
ers, which establishes the extension of permitted implications for them.
To sum up, Wittgenstein’s considerations on rule following tells us a few things 
that are of special concern in the present context. Linguistic meanings are never 
completely in command of linguistic users, since they necessarily rely on uncon-
scious layers of habits and inclinations; at the same time, linguistic meanings are 
learned in the context of intersubjective incentives and intersubjective recognition, 
therefore they embody normative demands. This means that our ordinary use of 
language, including our use of language to order our own thoughts, is perme-
ated by a normative intersubjective dimension, which is never fully transparent and 
never completely subject to conscious control.
4. The pitfalls of language as roots of metaphysical confusion
From these considerations on rule following we can infer a specifi c theoretical 
picture.
21 Ivi, § 199.
22 Ivi, § 202.
23 The reference to Humpty Dumpty comes from an episode in Through the Looking-Glass 
by Lewis Carroll: “‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less’” (L. Carroll, Through the Looking-
Glass, Raleigh (NC), Hayes Barton Press, 1872, p. 72).
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Meanings (rules) have something like ‘examples’ at their core. When we are 
required to perform deliberations based on the meanings we have learned, such 
examples may come to our mind in the form of ‘images’. The connection between 
such mental images and the experiential institution of the rules of verbal use is 
discussed at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, where we fi nd the 
well-known language-game in which a child is sent to take fi ve red apples to the 
shopkeeper. In order to carry out the task, the child makes use of some material 
images, and precisely a written slip of paper and physical color samples24. Here 
Wittgenstein ‘externalizes’ the mental representation in the form of written words 
and material samples of color in order to draw the attention of the reader to the 
non-enigmatic nature of the images occurring in thought. We may be tempted 
to think that the ‘internal’ nature of mental representations confers them special 
powers, but Wittgenstein shows that the true conceptual problem does not lie in 
the nature of images, mental or otherwise (symbols, pictures, signs, etc.), but in the 
rules that allow the child to connect signs and material samples to facts and states 
of affairs. This is a strong change of emphasis in comparison to the Tractatus.
In the Tractatus thought was understood to meaningfully relate to its objects 
through the appropriateness of symbols (to which all terms of language and mental 
pictures were reduced), which should be somehow isomorphic with the intended 
content; yet, the “method of projection”25 that should connect symbols and facts 
was left in shadow. In the Philosophical Investigations, on the contrary, it is the 
‘method of projection’ that takes center stage, and such ‘method of projection’ is 
represented by language use and rules.
In the Tractatus, meaning was conceived as something that could be somehow 
reduced to the way in which a picture (i.e., a proposition) projected onto the facts 
of the world; therefore an appropriate symbolism was supposed to be the right 
way to correct the Scheinsätze (meaningless propositions). On the contrary, in the 
Investigations the focus is no longer on the appropriateness of the symbols (words, 
pictures), which are no longer understood as something that should have the same 
essential structure, the same “logical multiplicity”26 as the signifi ed object. In order 
to grasp the true content of a sentence or a rule we have to investigate its use, the 
intersubjective practice that supports and reinforces its sense. Wittgenstein did 
never entertain the naïve idea that mental pictures should be something like literal 
pictures (copies) of facts, yet in the Investigations a truly new approach emerges: 
the very sphere of mental pictures appears more and more as something essentially 
misleading. Indeed, when we make use of language, it seems that we signifi cantly 
rely on ‘pictures’ of a kind: “Uttering a word is like striking a note on the key-
board of the imagination”27; that is, for each linguistic articulation we seem to have 
‘mental pictures’ or, at least, some kind of concomitant internal experiences. But 
24 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, cit., § 1.
25 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), ed. by D. F. Pears and B. F. Mc-
Guinness, London, Routledge, 1974, 3.11.
26 Ivi, 4.04.
27 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, cit., § 6.
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the actual content of words is not to be found in such concomitant ‘pictures’. The 
content of the evoked images is authentically expressed only by their use, that is, 
by the sequence of implications that we are prone to develop in the wake of our 
comprehension of that proposition or rule.
At this point, we can begin to see in which sense the psychoanalytic problem of 
the unconscious may have an analogical correspondent at the metaphysical level. 
The ‘mental picture’, or, more generally, whatever prima facie comes to our mind 
when a rule is mentioned or a proposition is heard, is the prima facie conscious side 
of meaning. But in fact, such manifest side of rules and meanings does not really 
warrant awareness of and control over their pertinent implications. This implies 
that in many circumstances we may believe to be in control of the true meaning of 
our thoughts, whereas we have just a shallow appreciation of what is implied by 
the representations that we are currently entertaining. This lack of conscious com-
mand could be analogically transposed into psychoanalytic terms through the no-
tion of “unconscious” (including also the “pre-conscious”, since the sphere of the 
meaningful implications of mental images and current interior experiences does 
not offer ‘resistance’ to being brought to consciousness). The core of the analogy 
here lies in the contrast between the apparent transparency of mental contents 
and the always lurking possibility to be led astray in one’s own deliberations and 
actions.
Incidentally, there is also a further side of the analogy that can be appreciated. 
As John Heaton notices28, metaphysics and psychoanalysis share a second nega-
tive trait: both tend to obliterate “the distinction between factual and conceptual 
investigation”29. In metaphysics this problem is due to the tendency to hypostasize 
the mental images that accompany the use of concepts as true bearers of their 
meaning.
This picture must be completed by recalling that all meanings embody a norma-
tive dimension. All verbal meanings are instituted through intersubjective recog-
nition. In this primary sense each verbal meaning does already have a normative 
value. But when we come to the level of life projects and metaphysical visions, by 
using verbal meanings in refl ection, we reach a further dimension of normativ-
ity: the contents of our beliefs aspire at having objective validity, that is, they are 
grasped as something that could be endorsed and embodied by an infi nite plurality 
of subjects. This implies that those contents can transcend the limited individual 
that each of us is, and aim at a higher level of meaningfulness. In other terms, when-
ever we entertain thoughts about the world and our position in it (‘metaphysical 
thoughts’, Weltanschauungen) we have access to a dimension of meaningfulness, 
which goes beyond mere feelings and sensuous motives. The vision that we gain at 
this level provides us with something like a ‘map’ to orient ourselves in the world, 
and this map is also essential part of our self-identity, of the personal identity that 
we acknowledge and that helps to confer meaning (direction) to our actions. This 
28 J. M. Heaton, op. cit., p. 123.
29 L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, cit., § 459.
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is the level at which we root our reasons to act. Our conscious identity and our 
interpretation of the position of our actions in the world are strictly connected.
It is important to stress that this refl ective stage where we position ourselves in 
the world is intensely charged with emotional value for us. We do highly value our 
ability to conceive of ourselves as parts of a meaningful course of action endowed 
with potentially universal validity; on the opposite, even the mere possibility of 
being deluded as to our self-positioning in the world is disquieting and unsettling.
5. Metaphysical disorientation and identity disruption
At this point we can come back to the psychoanalytic framework and outline the 
core analogy between the function of philosophy and psychoanalysis as therapies 
of reasons to act through language.
In classical psychoanalysis neurosis are dysfunctional behaviours (phobias, ob-
sessions, hysteria, etc.) that express a motivational sphere which is not reconciled 
with the settled self-identity of the agent and which produces areas of apparently 
irrational compulsions. Neurosis is supposed to emerge from some confl ict that 
threatens the identity of the ego without being dominant over such identity, where-
as, when the same sort of confl icts reaches the core of self-identity, the very unity 
of the ego is shaken and this is labelled “psychosis”30.
Does anything similar to neurosis/psychosis take place at the level of philo-
sophical refl ection? To pursue the analogy some qualifi cations must be added. Let 
us begin by recalling some examples of misleading philosophical problems; in fact, 
they are found more easily in the Tractatus than in the following work. For in-
stance, in the Tractatus solipsism is shown to be ‘true’ in a trivial sense; however, 
this ‘trivial’ understanding of solipsism excludes many traits that are usually as-
sociated with our image of ‘solipsism’, like individualism, loneliness, derealisation, 
which are nothing but misleading implications drawn from the original intuition 
that supports ‘solipsism’31. Another perspective that is proved to be unviable in the 
Tractatus is the idea that our representational powers could establish a priori the 
limits of what is really possible in the world, and of what is not32. A further object 
of criticism is the suggestion that there could be something like a ‘mathematical 
meaning’ of the world33, as well as the idea that the choice of a specifi c system of 
physical descriptions (like the Newtonian one) can express something relevant to 
the substance of the world-in-itself34, etc. Each of these Wittgensteinian arguments 
30 “In neurosis the ego suppresses part of the id out of allegiance to reality, whereas in 
psychosis it lets itself be carried away by the id and detached from a part of reality” (S. Freud, 
Fetischismus, in “Almanach der Psychoanalyse 1928” (Wien, 1927); Engl. transl. by J. Riviere, 
Fetishism, in Sexuality and the Psychology of Love, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1963, p. 207).
31 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, cit., 5.64.
32 Ivi, 5.61.
33 Ivi, 6.21 f.
34 Ivi, 6.341 f.
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is destructive and is not replaced by any positive thesis. In the Philosophical Inves-
tigations we can mostly track the same or similar negative arguments, even if they 
are rarely stated as straightforwardly as in the Tractatus. For instance, the criticism 
to solipsism, can be detected in the background of a plurality of analysis, like the 
discussions on the so-called “private language of sensations”, but in general the 
relevant target is less clearly stated than in the Tractatus, where the claim to fi nally 
obtain the correct point of view on being, knowledge and subjectivity was explicit.
The question now is: to which extent could similar metaphysical mistakes, if 
they are such, really produce personally disrupting outcomes? Wittgenstein shows 
a remarkable self-restraint on this point, which apparently is assigned to the fi eld 
of those thoughts that should be left to the reader’s initiative35. But the intuition 
that metaphysical error may involve existential error and sufferance is often a tacit 
presupposition in the history of thought, without which many philosophical and 
theological battles would seem pointless. Still, in a Wittgensteinian framework this 
stance is not easy to argue, because it is not clear what positive value, if any, could 
be attributed to ‘metaphysical truthfulness’. The picture that Wittgenstein endorses 
seems to imply that metaphysical beliefs, while spontaneously growing in people’s 
mind, do not really have any function; yet, when they go astray they turn out to be 
positively damaging. Yet, this asymmetrical nature attributed to metaphysical be-
liefs seems odd: how could it be the case, that something deprived of any function 
could suddenly turn into something dysfunctional, when it appears to be wrong?
Let us fi rst ask: what is the kind of ‘damage’ that Wittgenstein could have in 
mind in the cases where metaphysical error is denounced? For instance, the idea 
that a private language of sensations is possible would imply that our sensations are 
intrinsically bearers of meaning. Therefore, our thought could be considered epis-
temically self-suffi cient without reference to intersubjective criteria and standards. 
This picture may enforce solipsistic and individualistic views, which can lead to 
disregard or trivialize both external reality and interpersonal relations.
Yet, even if we personally dislike the moral outcomes that we judge to lurk in 
the relevant metaphysical mistakes, this dislike seems to rest on an extrinsic moral 
source. But appealing to a separate moral source to justify the task of philosophical 
clarifi cation sounds un-Wittgensteinian and intrinsically dubious.
Indeed, we can see an alternative to this option if we consider that the ‘mis-
taken’ character that Wittgenstein is signalling in his analyses is not concerned 
with factual falsity. Actually, and this is an old Kantian thought that Wittgenstein 
updates, metaphysical propositions do not manifest the character of empirical fal-
sifi ability and are not to be conceived as pictures projecting on factual states of 
affairs. In the Tractatus this was enough to qualify such propositions as unsinnig. 
The philosophical mistakes that Wittgenstein brings to light have a very specifi c 
character: they are statements that appear prima facie wholly acceptable or anyway 
35 “Whatever the reader can do too, leave to the reader” (L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Be-
merkungen, ed. by G. H. von Wright, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1977; Engl. transl. by P. 
Winch, Culture and Value, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 77).
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possible, but whose implications turn out to be not just counterintuitive, but, in a 
sense to be clarifi ed, self-contradictory.
What kind of self-contradictoriness is this? As we noted, when we grasp a 
proposition, there can be a confl ict between what “comes before our mind in an 
instant” and its use36, between a picture that makes us expect a certain applica-
tion and its actual application37. That is, there can be a confl ict between what we 
consciously believe about our beliefs and their actual implications, of which we 
are inadequately conscious. Here the confl ict can be expressed as ‘internal con-
tradiction’, although, properly speaking, the contradiction runs between vaguely 
expected implications and the implications that we grant when analytically unfold-
ing the meaning of the proposition. This is no formal contradiction: we cannot 
realize its subsistence just by looking at the signs that we use to express it. Yet, it is 
appropriate to talk of contradiction, and not merely of a confl ict between expec-
tation and realisation, because the problem consists in the perception of internal 
incompatibility itself, and not in a mere “disappointment” due to an unsatisfactory 
outcome. In such instances, the failure does not lie in the mere inability to obtain 
satisfaction, to have the expectation fulfi lled. If this was the case, we might con-
sider perfectly in order a lucky outcome based on wrong reasons; yet, if my beliefs 
are untenable, but a windfall brings to me a pleasant result, this does not redeem 
the failure of my beliefs. Even if we could enjoy the pleasant outcome, an internal 
disruption of our reasons to act signals a deep threat, which needs to be corrected.
But, then, why metaphysical inconsistencies should be disrupting for us? We 
have not shown yet, where the alleged ‘self-contradictoriness’ should lie and how it 
should produce its effects. Let us take into consideration a metaphysical thesis that 
Wittgenstein, a keen reader of Schopenhauer, discusses very early, that is, the thesis 
that ‘the world, being subject to the will, is a subjective illusion’. This thesis, which 
is akin to classical solipsistic stances, may affect one’s attitude towards life and may 
encourage a range of practical consequences including ataraxia, resignation, ascet-
ism, etc. The relevant ethical attitude may appear to us appealing or appalling, but 
in any case, whatever the inclination or disinclination towards it, it is not primar-
ily at this emotional level that its validity is to be judged. And its validity cannot 
be established at the level of empirical verifi cation/falsifi cation either, since no 
particular state of affairs could confi rm or disconfi rm such a metaphysical picture.
On the contrary, the criterion of internal consistency has something essential 
to say about the possible validity of such vision. By taking advantage of scattered 
Wittgensteinian remarks, we could produce an objection to the mentioned meta-
physical thesis along the following lines.
First, if you want to determine that something is an illusion, you should have a 
standard of reality. But if this is the case, how can you apply the predicate ‘illusory’ 
to everything there is? How could you ever determine that something is delusional 
if you never met anything that was not delusional?
36 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, cit., § 139.
37 Ivi, § 141.
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Secondly, if the delusional nature of the world derives from its dependence on 
a sovereign subjective will, then we should ask whether our idea of an absolutely 
sovereign will is intelligible. Yet, a Schopenhauerian ‘Will’ can be absolutely sov-
ereign only by being all-powerful, but an all-powerful will denies any dependence 
from an ‘external’ reality and meets no otherness that could resist to it. But, if a 
will is never applied to anything foreign to the will, if nothing manifests resistance 
to the will, then how could we determine what a will is at all? We are using a no-
tion (‘will’) that makes sense in a specifi c context (agency exercised on a not fully 
compliant reality), and then make out of it an altogether different notion, which is 
phenomenologically unknown and essentially unintelligible.
Both arguments show that, suggestive as it may be, the vision according to 
which ‘the world is a subjective illusion’ leads to a conceptual deadlock. The rel-
evant metaphysical thesis is unable to order our options and to guide our actions. Its 
inconsistencies do not allow us to differentiate between what is valid and what is 
not in our world, between what is possible and what not in our acts: we end up be-
ing confused about our position in the world and about the orientation of our acts.
The relevant vision turns out to be internally inconsistent and confusing, even 
if such inconsistency could not be detected at a merely formal level and even if it 
did not emerge at fi rst sight.
Come to this point, in the wake of Wittgenstein’s analyses, we have to raise a 
further question: to which extent is it plausible to attribute a true power of ethical 
disruption to inconsistencies? The question must be raised because, according to 
Wittgenstein himself, contradictions are not necessarily damaging to reasoning. 
His argument in this respect runs as follows: let us suppose that there is a contra-
diction lurking in the hidden folds of current mathematics. Even if this was the 
case, till now we have made use of mathematical inferences with great success 
and this demonstrates at least that mathematics can be remarkably useful even 
if it includes such an inconsistency38. Actually, the potential manifestation of a 
contradiction in a system of thought is not bound to harm our inferential abilities. 
We may entertain beliefs that are in contradiction with each other, but that are 
couched in a form that make their incompatibility inconsequential. For instance, 
I can have the recollection of two-year old Mike waiting in the Hospital with his 
parents while his aunt gave birth to his cousin Bill. At the same time, I can expect 
that next June Bill will become of age, while Mike is still under age. If I am not 
usually required to refl ect on the relationship between Mike and Bill (they may 
live afar and be seldom object of my concern), I may perfectly well entertain both 
beliefs, their contradictoriness notwithstanding, without such contradiction ever 
materializing.
But, if contradiction is not a kind of ‘sickness’ that spontaneously spreads 
through the body of our beliefs, we do not necessarily have to drop any system of 
beliefs where a contradiction may hide. As Wittgenstein says, even if a contradic-
38 L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Bemerkungen über die 
Grundlagen der Mathematik), ed. by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, Engl. 
transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1983, p. 199.
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tion emerges, we may be able to ‘neutralize’ it and thus avoid stumbling into it. 
This is, for instance, how we historically dealt with the arithmetical demand to 
solve the square root of a negative number. Although this operation would be, 
strictly speaking, a logical contradiction, we found a way to bypass it, by introduc-
ing imaginary numbers39.
The interesting point here is that this neutralizing process is not always possible. 
As Wittgenstein writes, in order to be able to circumscribe a contradiction and 
neutralize its potentially disrupting implications, we must dominate the relevant 
calculus, we must “know our way about” it40. This specifi cation clarifi es why and 
to which extent a contradiction can still be a serious problem in reasoning: this 
happens when we do not know our way around the representational system that 
we are considering.
And here we come back to metaphysics and to its analogy with psychoanalysis. 
With regard to metaphysical beliefs, we do not “know our way about” by defi ni-
tion. Inconsistencies in metaphysics are intolerable because metaphysical visions 
are tentative maps that should defi ne our position in the world and thus orient our 
behaviour. They are not maps that ‘reproduce’ a visible territory: their adequate-
ness to existence can be never challenged just by empirical facts because their role 
is not factually descriptive. Metaphysical visions claim to represent objective uni-
versal scenarios, which concern the world as a synthesis of what there have been, 
what there is and what there will be.
Moreover, the world, as a space of real possibilities, is the correlate of the self, 
as a space of possible acts. By outlining the metaphysical features of the world we 
simultaneously determine the identity of a concomitant agency in this world. This 
implies that an inconsistent metaphysical picture of the world can be correlated 
with a faltering or broken identity of the self. And this brings us back to the core of 
the analogy between philosophy and psychoanalysis: insofar as psychoanalysis is 
deputed to establish or regain a healthy (or at least viable) identity of the self, it ex-
presses a function that shows some affi nity to metaphysics, which tries to provide 
visions of the world where an agent can ‘fi nd her way around’.
Inconsistencies in metaphysical theses can produce something analogous to the 
psychological confl icts treated by psychoanalysis. Here we have the same crucial 
ingredients: lack of conscious control between normative confl icting instances, 
which are motivationally laden. Here the manifest appearance of an idea (‘mental 
image’) conceals its true motivational roots. The confl ict cannot be rationally by-
passed, because we do not know our way about it. And the normative demands 
of metaphysical stances make not possible to take control of the confl ict through 
mere subjective choice. Under these conditions, metaphysical inconsistencies, like 
psychological confl icts, can produce spiritual damage.
39 Ivi, p. 209.
40 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, cit., § 123.
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6. Metaphysics and psychoanalysis: a qualifi ed analogy
Come to this point we can try to draw some general conclusions about the sense 
to be attributed to Wittgenstein’s analogy between philosophy and psychoanalysis. 
At the beginning of our analysis we emphasised three aspects where the analogy 
seemed to be convincing and illuminating: 1) both philosophy and psychoanalysis 
had to do with a crucial motivational level and its confl icts; 2) they had both to do 
with reasons to act that may be unconscious and should become conscious; 3) the 
‘healing’ power of both activities was assigned to a specifi c practice of language. 
Let us examine in turn the status of each question in the light of the previous con-
siderations.
1) In a Wittgensteinian framework, both philosophy (as metaphysics) and psy-
choanalysis deal with a source of ‘mental unease’, which is emotionally charged 
and motivationally powerful. Prima facie, we could see the metaphysical inclina-
tion as a kind of ‘need’ (Kant’s metaphysica naturalis), which imposes itself on hu-
man minds, regardless of any acquaintance with metaphysics in a technical sense. 
Metaphysics appears as the historical name of a constitutive ‘need’ to depict a 
‘world-map’ aimed at orienting our life-projects, expectations, hopes, choices and 
thus also our sense of personal identity. To any self-conscious being this level of 
‘world-beliefs’ is decisive for the life of consciousness and therefore, far from being 
a highbrow luxury, it performs an unrenounceable function.
However, the limits of the analogy must be clearly recognized. When we con-
ceive of the ‘metaphysical need’ after the model of a ‘human need’, in a sense 
analogous to the role played by sexual drives in the Freudian framework, we may 
be misled. We may have the impression of gaining a privileged point of view that 
‘naturalizes’ metaphysics and that, by so doing, allows taking distance from meta-
physics and its ‘compulsion’. But such an interpretation would be deceitful. To see 
the ‘need’ for a world-view as a ‘natural need’ is, in its turn, a specifi c (and highly 
debatable) metaphysical vision. It provides a mental image where ‘spiritual needs’ 
are treated as biological facts, and this is a metaphysical stance since it depicts our 
‘soul’ and our ‘world’ in a way that in principle cannot be subject to proof. More 
precisely, it is an inconsistent metaphysical vision, because it conveys the idea of be-
ing something foreign to the ‘human all too human’ enchantment of metaphysics, 
while being unawarely subject to it. In this sense Kant’s critical attitude towards 
metaphysics shows a somehow subtler awareness of the depth of the problem than 
Wittgenstein’s criticism, which seems to entail that systematically dispatching any 
metaphysical vision could be a viable existential option.
2) Still, what Wittgenstein has in mind could be clarifi ed through a second level 
of analogy with psychoanalysis, concerning the nature of its qualifying reasons. As 
we know, according to Wittgenstein philosophy must take care of itself also in the 
sense that it appears as a therapy for a disease caused by philosophy itself. There-
fore, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, we could distinguish within philosophy 
two spheres of activity: philosophy as metaphysical production of Weltanschauun-
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gen and philosophy as therapeutic activity of clarifi cation of language, which heals 
the spiritual injuries produced by metaphysics. Here the analogy between philo-
sophical therapy and psychotherapy is intriguing. Both, philosophy as therapeutic 
activity and psychoanalysis seem to be committed to a negative use of reason. On 
the one hand, psychoanalytic therapy must not try to impose a specifi c personality, 
but should just help to consolidate any viable conscious personality (ego). On the 
other hand, philosophy should just bring about a process of ‘conceptual cleans-
ing’, while leaving to anybody the free choice of the world-view that one most pre-
fers. Both ‘therapeutic attitudes’ seem to imply a liberal stance of non-interference 
with identity-bestowing reasons.
But here again the analogy may turn out to be potentially misleading. The psy-
chologist may assume that a reason to intervene is the subsistence of a condition 
of sufferance, primarily acknowledged by the patient, and can consider her own 
task accomplished as soon as the patient is able to come back to ordinary life. To 
apply this view to philosophy would imply that a ‘philosophical patient’ turns to 
the Wittgensteinian approach in order to be freed from specifi c confusions; and 
as soon as they are solved, the healed consciousness can freely turn to the world-
beliefs that one mostly feels attracted to. Here there would be no room for any 
claim of truth about the world, which would be left to the private sphere of the 
individual. Yet, this is again a peculiar metaphysical vision, and precisely a ‘lib-
eral’ and subjectivistic vision, where objectivity and Weltanschauungen are seen 
as wholly irreconcilable instances. The problem is that it is quite uncertain that a 
Weltanschauung could be taken just as a comfortable dress of ideas that allows my 
individual personality to fl ourish. This can be hardly the case because an essential 
component of the power of a metaphysical vision rests on the possibility for it to be 
universally valid, and therefore to be shared and to be endorsed beyond the limits 
of my fi nite individuality.
Let us suppose that a patient comes out of psychoanalytic therapy having 
reached a balanced personality and that in the therapeutic process she has learned 
to rely on some interpretive props provided by an erroneous theory (e.g., the 
mythological picture of collective murder displayed in Freud’s Totem and Taboo)41. 
If the self-interpretation works, its reliance on mistaken beliefs can be perfectly 
tolerable, insofar as its application does not exceed the limits of the individual 
self-interpretation. But this situation cannot be straightforwardly transposed to 
philosophical stances: it is essential part of a metaphysical view to claim potential 
universality, and this claim is intrinsic to its function. Indeed, if this were not the 
case even the criterion of non-contradictoriness, which we have seen to be essential 
to solve metaphysical deadlocks would be irrelevant. Any metaphysical vision aims 
at universality and objectivity, and operates with public reasons, precisely because 
the possibility of transcending my individual limits lies at the core of its meaning-
fulness. Incidentally, it must be noticed that a claim to objectivity (universal inter-
41 S. Freud, Totem und Tabu, Wien, Hugo Heller, 1913; Engl. transl. by J. Strachey, Totem 
and Taboo, London, Routledge, 1950.
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subjective validity) is not the same as a claim to uniqueness: an objectively valid 
metaphysical view does not necessarily imply a claim to exclude any other vision, 
but does require that everybody in principle could share it.
3) This brings us to our last consideration. Like psychoanalysis, philosophy ex-
ercises its therapeutic role through language and by working on reasons; as Heaton 
puts it, they are both ‘talking cures’42. In the § 1 of the Philosophical Remarks, we 
fi nd the fi rst explicit expression of Wittgenstein’s relinquishment of the theses of 
the Tractatus in the form of a rejection of the search for an ideal language. Witt-
genstein writes that he no longer has a “primary” or “phenomenological” language 
in mind as a philosophical goal, and by primary or phenomenological language he 
meant a language that was more ‘authentic’ than everyday language, insofar as its 
signs were apt to provide a correct representation of facts. After the Tractatus Witt-
genstein reaches the conclusion that the ordinary language and its everyday use can 
provide all the normativity that we need for redressing our metaphysical mistakes.
Yet, this reference to ordinary or everyday language is not wholly perspicuous. 
Indeed, two questions immediately arise: 1) Does the ordinary use of language have 
recognisable boundaries that separate it from other, possibly illegitimate, uses of 
language? 2) Why should the daily use of language represent a benchmark for pos-
sible different uses of it? These questions do not receive any proper answer in Witt-
genstein’s pages. We conjecture that in the Wittgensteinian framework only formal 
languages can be clearly separated from ordinary language. Yet, what we actually 
gather from Wittgenstein’s statements is that the daily use of language is mainly 
opposed to the language of philosophical theories, which is said to be “language 
gone on holiday”43 leading to philosophical propositions that are like “idly running 
wheels”44. But one may wonder whether this is not tantamount to re-introducing 
a distinction between an authentic and an inauthentic sphere of language expres-
sions, without properly considering the relevant uses. Indeed, what should we as-
sume in order to separate the ‘daily’ use of language from the alleged ‘holiday use’? 
Is it just a ma tter of frequency of use? And even if frequency of use would be 
univocally ascertainable, why should greater frequency warrant a more appropriate 
or genuine use? If most people make less frequently use of propositions about the 
world, or time, or personal identity, than about supermarket prices or local politics, 
does this speak in favour of a superior epistemic status of the second ones? Why?
In fact, a charitable reader could plausibly discern what Wittgenstein has in 
mind: as we have seen with regard to the apprehension of rules, we learn the rules 
of language, syntax and semantics, through examples, intersubjective reinforce-
ment and corrections. This means that we fi rst learn expressions that refer to 
frequent situations and everyday contexts, where examples are readily accessible 
42 J. M. Heaton, op. cit., p. 211.
43 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, cit., § 38.
44 Idem, Philosophical Remarks (Philosophische Bemerkungen), ed. by R. Rhees, Engl. transl. 
by R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, § 1; Idem, Philosophical Investi-
gations, cit., § 271 e § 132.
Filosofia     ON WITTGENSTEIN'S ANALOGY BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 237
and reinforcement easy to get. Successively we may refi ne the articulation of our 
linguistic concepts by learning special uses in special contexts. Among the special 
uses of language we fi nd scientifi c and artistic disciplines, the technical terminol-
ogy of law or economics, and indeed also the language of epistemology, meta-
physics, theology, etc. This plausible chronological priority suggests a genealogic 
priority of the units of meaning of daily use, and this genealogic order may turn out 
to be illuminating in understanding more technical uses. This may be an impor-
tant methodological suggestion about how to clarify some ambiguous or unclear 
expressions; for instance, my notion of philosophical temporality may be clarifi ed 
by paying attention to the local daily language games that support our primary use 
of terms. And as Wittgenstein observes, each language game is correlated to an 
intersubjective practice, to a ‘form of life’, which can work as it does insofar as it 
makes use of the rules of the relevant language game.
Granted the potential fruitfulness of this methodological remark, still, this at-
tention to the genealogically primary bases of more refi ned language games does 
not represent a way to separate proper from improper uses of language. Here we 
must not confuse two different considerations. On the one hand, there is the idea 
that by looking at the actual use of language we can clarify meaning. This implies 
that we can explain words and propositions by resorting to an examination of the 
whole range of commonly accessible implications of the relevant sentences. This 
thesis, however, has nothing to do with the altogether different thesis, according 
to which there is, within language use, a genuine level of use and a constitutively 
inauthentic level of use. That is, that there is a practical everyday use which would 
be the bearer of authenticity and a theoretical ‘holiday use’, which would be bound 
to produce metaphysical confusions. 
If we grant that the second thesis is groundless, we must conclude that there is at 
least an essential unanswered question in Wittgenstein’s account, a question, which 
he was not entitled to ignore and that in the present limits we can only hint at.
As we tried to show, we must grant to metaphysical visions an actual function 
and metaphysical visions must be elaborated and entertained by means of an in-
tersubjectively intelligible language. If this is the case, then any discussion about 
powers and limits of metaphysical visions should, fi rst, question the way in which 
‘specialized’ languages, like the language of science or metaphysics, bring to light 
their meanings. That is, we should ask what the expressive powers of the language-
games that institute scientifi c or metaphysical pictures are. Secondarily, we should 
dwell on the potentialities of the forms of life that are enabled to exist by metaphys-
ical visions. These considerations could allow us a change of perspective about 
metaphysics, whose sense and evaluation could be more profi tably established at 
an ethical level than at an empirical one.
Psychoanalysis establishes a verbal technique in order to get rid of neurosis or 
psychosis as much as the philosophical activity that Wittgenstein proposes tries 
to get rid of conceptual enigmas, which may lead to metaphysical confusions45. If 
45 J. M. Heaton, op. cit., p. 139.
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what legitimates a language game is its use in an actual form of life, we should ask 
whether a human form of life could ever subsist without any metaphysical vision. 
If, on the contrary, metaphysical visions are something like the atmosphere that al-
lows conscious life to live and possibly thrive, then we may prepare the ground for 
a new way to look at the truth-value of metaphysical visions, a way that includes 
among the epistemic criteria of validity for metaphysics its ethical force.
